The Politically Captured Meritocracy of Civil Servants and Its Implications for Regional Productivity and Investment

Abstract

This study aims to analyze how the struggle for meritocracy within the State Civil Apparatus (ASN), shaped by regional heads' political interests, affects bureaucratic productivity and regional investment. This problem arises from the practice of post-election bureaucratic politicization, which places political loyalty above professional competence in job placement, career promotion, and the distribution of ASN welfare.  This condition has weakened the merit system, reduced the quality of public services, and increased regional economic transaction costs.  Qualitative data were collected through in-depth interviews with ASN, regional officials, and business actors, as well as analysis of policy documents and media coverage.  The results show that ASN politicization has led to increased non-merit transfers, bureaucratic uncertainty, delays in business licensing, and decreased certainty in regional economic regulations.  Patronage practices have also led to low professional motivation among ASN and distortions in APBD management that are not aligned with development priorities.  As a result, regional investment realization stagnates, business costs increase, and local economic competitiveness weakens. This study concludes that meritocratic civil service is a crucial institutional foundation for regional economic productivity. The seizure of meritocracy by political interests not only undermines governance but also creates structural economic disadvantages that hinder sustainable regional development.